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Abstract
Preferences for redistribution, as well as the generosities of welfare
states, diﬀer signiﬁcantly across countries. In this paper, we test whether
there exists a feedback process of the economic regime on individual prefer-
ences. We exploit the experiment of German separation and reuniﬁcation
to establish exogeneity of the economic system. From 1945 to 1990, East
Germans lived under a Communist regime with heavy state intervention
and extensive redistribution. We ﬁnd that, after German reuniﬁcation,
East Germans are more in favor of redistribution and state intervention
than West Germans, even after controlling for economic incentives. This
eﬀect is especially strong for older cohorts, who lived under Communism
for a longer time period. We ﬁnd that East Germans’ preferences converge
towards those of West Germans, and we calculate that it will take one to
two generations for preferences to converge completely.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Preferences for redistribution and redistributive policies diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
countries.1 Are the regimes diﬀerent solely because of diﬀerent initial prefer-
ences for redistribution in the populations? Or is there a feedback eﬀect from
the regime on preferences? Is it possible that living under a speciﬁcs y s t e ml e a d s
to adaptation of preferences?2 To put it more bluntly: are individual preferences
∗We thank Matthias Schündeln and Andrei Shleifer for conversations, participants in a
seminar at Harvard for comments, and Antonia Attanassova and Francesco Trebbi for excellent
research assistantship. Alesina gratefully acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the NSF with
a grant through the NBER.
1For instance, the diﬀerence between Europe and the US has been discussed recently by
Alesina and Glaeser (2004).
2Several recent theoretical papers have shown that there is scope for multiple equilibria
and self-fulﬁlling beliefs, i.e. that preferences inﬂuence the regime, and that the regime has
a feedback on preferences (see e.g. Piketty 1995, Alesina and Angeletos 2005, and Benabou
and Tirole 2005).
1endogenous to political regimes? In order to answer this question empirically,
one needs an exogenous shock to the regime; post war Germany oﬀers an oppor-
tunity to analyze the eﬀect of one particular regime, Communism, on people’s
preferences.
From 1945 to 1990, Germany was split into two parts for reasons that had
nothing to do with Germans’ desire for separation, or diversity of visions be-
tween East Germans and West Germans: the division of Germany into two
parts was exogenous with respect to underlying individual preferences. Since
the political and economic system has been the same in the eastern and western
parts of Germany since reuniﬁcation in 1990, and was the same before 1945,
West Germans constitute a meaningful control group for East Germans. There-
fore, comparing the diﬀerences in attitudes and preferences of Germans after
the reuniﬁcation can give us a clue about the eﬀects of living for 45 years under
a Communist regime on attitudes, beliefs and political preferences.
We are especially interested in measuring how 45 years of Communism af-
fected individuals’ thinking toward market capitalism and the role of the state
in providing welfare and redistribution from the rich to the poor. If political
regimes had no eﬀects on individual preferences one should not observe any
systematic diﬀerence between East and West Germans after reuniﬁcation. If
Communism had an eﬀect, in principle one could think of two possible reac-
tions to 45 years of Communist dictatorship. One is that people turn strongly
against the “state” and switch to preferences in the opposite direction, namely
in favor of liberitarian free markets, as a reaction to an all intrusive state. The
opposite hypothesis is that 45 years of heavy state intervention and indoctrina-
tion instill in people the view that the state is essential for individual well being.
As we shall see, we quickly and soundly reject the ﬁrst hypothesis in favor of
the second. In fact, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects of Communism are large and long
lasting. It will take about one to two generations for former East and West
Germans to look alike in terms of preferences and attitudes about fundamental
questions regarding the role of the government in society.
There can be two eﬀects of Communism on individual preferences, namely
a purely economic one, and an eﬀect on intrinsic preferences. The latter could
arise because of Marxist Leninist indoctrination, state control over school, press,
or state television, etc. Also, simply becoming accustomed to an all encompass-
ing state may make people think of it as necessary and preferable despite the
suﬀocating aspects of the East German regime. This is the eﬀect we are most
interested in. The former eﬀect arises because Communism has made former
East Germany relatively poorer than former West Germany. Since the poor
disproportionately beneﬁt from government redistribution, they favor it. We
ﬁnd evidence of both types of eﬀect.
We also investigate “why” former East Germans are more likely to favor state
intervention. One reason is that they are simply used to it. Another reason
is that East Germans believe much more so than West Germans that social
conditions, rather than individual eﬀort and initiative, determine individual
fortunes; this belief is of course one basic tenet of the communist ideology. The
more one thinks that it is society’s “fault” if one is poor, unemployed or sick,
2the more one is in favor of public intervention. We ﬁnd evidence for both eﬀects.
Last, we analyze whether preferences of East Germans converge towards
those of West Germans, given that they now live under the same regime West
Germans have experienced since 1945. We calculate that it will take about 20
to 40 years to make the diﬀerence between East and West Germans disappear
almost completely, due to the combination of two forces. One is the dying of
the elderly and the coming of age of individuals born after reuniﬁcation; the
other is the actual change of preferences of the same individuals. We estimate
the ﬁrst eﬀect to account for about 1/3 of the convergence eﬀect and the other
one to account for the remaining 2/3 of the convergence.
An implication of all of the above is that Germany in 1990 has been subject
to a major political shock, perhaps with deeper and longer lasting consequences
than the widely studied economic shock associated with the reuniﬁcation. A
country like former West Germany with an already generous welfare state, heavy
labor and goods market regulations etc., which many believe needs trimming,
has received a new 25 per cent of population inclined to prefer an even more
extensive role for the state, even after controlling for them being on average
net recipients of government intervention. This will make any political reform
towards trimming the welfare state (broadly deﬁned) especially diﬃcult. All of
those who believe that the economic future of Germany (which looks somewhat
bleak at the moment) will look brighter with a host of so called “structural
reforms” should be especially concerned.3
The question of preferences for redistribution and diﬀerent visions about the
welfare state has recently received much attention. Alesina and Glaeser (2004)
discuss the origin of diﬀerent beliefs and preferences in the US and Continental
Western Europe, and in fact place a lot of weight on the inﬂuence of Marxist
ideology on the preference for redistribution in Europe versus the US. Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) and Fong (2003) investigate the connection about views
about social mobility and preferences for redistribution using US data. Ravallion
and Lokshin (2000) consider Russian data. In general, this literature ﬁnds that
the more individuals perceive that there is social mobility the less favorable they
are to government redistribution.
The paper most closely related to ours is Corneo (2001). Building on Cor-
neo and Grüner (2002), he studies empirically what motivates individuals to
favor redistribution, from purely individual to altruistic motives. In examining
this issue, Corneo (2001) compares preferences in the US, West Germany and
East Germany. One of his results is that East Germans are more favorable
to redistribution than West Germans, who, in turn, are more favorable to it
than Americans. More generally, in a comparison of 6 Eastern European and 6
Western countries, Corneo and Grüner (2002) ﬁnd large country ﬁxed eﬀects for
Eastern European countries; i.e. they ﬁnd that Eastern Europeans have stronger
preferences for redistribution than individuals from Western countries.4 Corneo
3Giavazzi and McMahon (2005) have recently pointed out how the German reform process
in fact is lacking political support from the people.
4Besides East Germany, their sample includes Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania,
and Russia.
3(2001) as well as Corneo and Grüner (2002) use data from the 1992 round of the
International Social Survey Programme. We can expand on their analyses since
we use a panel data set. By using diﬀerent waves of our data, we can discuss
more precisely timing issues and speed of convergence of preferences.5 Moreover,
we can include many more individual controls. Last, by focusing on Germany,
we can distinguish more clearly the role of Communism in shaping preferences
from other potential reasons why Eastern Europeans might favor redistribution.
That is, it could be that preferences in Eastern Europe are diﬀerent because of
diﬀerent cultures, histories etc. even before the advent of Communism. More-
over, a more uncertain environment and absence of insurance markets could
induce Eastern Europeans to favor redistribution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the institutional
background, data and summary statistics. In Section 3 we present our basic re-
sults concerning preferences for state intervention in social policy. This section
breaks down eﬀects on preferences emerging from relative poverty in the East
f r o mt h ep u r ep r e f e r e n c ee ﬀect of communism. In Section 4 we investigate re-
lated attitudes about individual responsibility versus social conditions that can
explain diﬀerences in preferences regarding the welfare state. The last section
concludes.
2 Institutional Background, Data and Summary
Statistics
2.1 Institutional Background
Germany as a country was created in 1860 as a result of the political uniﬁcation
of 18 independent political units of various size, the largest and most powerful
being Prussia. Germany remained a single country until the end of the Second
World War when, as a losing power, it was split amongst the winning Allies. East
Germany was under the sphere of inﬂuence of the Soviets, while the West was
occupied by the US, France, and the UK. The borders between East and West
Germany were the result of bargaining between the Allies and the position of
the occupying forces at the end of hostilities. In 1949, both the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were oﬃcially
founded. The East German regime developed as one of the most rigid of the
former Communist regimes. Income inequality in the GDR was low: in 1988,
the average net income of individuals with a university degree was only 15%
higher than that of blue collar workers, compared to 70% in the FRG. Also,
intersectoral diﬀerences in net incomes were minimal, on average amounting
5In addition, we can also check whether West Germans are becoming more or less in favor
of the welfare state, an intriguing question given the recent attempt of the German government
to implement ”structural reforms”, a buzz word for pro market reforms. The political support
(or lack thereof) of such reforms is the result of the ”political shock” associated with the
arrival of new preferences for Easterners and the evolution of preferences of Westeners. Our
conclusions will not give much hope to those who see pro market reforms as desirable.
4only to 150 Mark per month with an average monthly income of around 1100
Mark in 1988 (Stephan and Wiedemann, 1990, Schäfgen, 1998). Reuniﬁcation
occurred rather quickly and abruptly in October 1990, 11 months after the fall
of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. East Germany became part of the Federal
Republic of Germany, and hence the economic and political system of the West
was transferred to the East.
One important identifying assumption of our analysis is that East and West
Germany were indistinguishable until the exogenously imposed separation in
1945. Because of this, if we observe diﬀerences in attitudes amongst East and
West Germans after reuniﬁcation, we can attribute them to 45 years of Com-
munism. How reasonable is the assumption that East and West Germans were
indistinguishable in terms of their attitudes before 1945? Table 1 shows average
per capita income levels of diﬀerent German regions, as well as subregions of
Prussia, in 1928, 1932, and 1936. We mark a region by E or W, depending
on whether it mainly belonged to the FRG or GDR between 1949 and 1990.
Unmarked regions do not belong to Germany after 1945.6 As the table shows,
the level of income per capita in pre-World War II Germany does not show
any systematic diﬀerence between East and West; in fact, on average they are
almost identical.7 Moreover, destruction during World War II was major and
u n i v e r s a li nb o t ht h el a t e rF R Ga n dG D R .
However, income per capita aside, there might have been diﬀerences in atti-
tudes before 1945. One possible issue is that Prussians might have had a more
militarist ”state-centric” view about the state than other Germans. Note how-
ever that part of former Prussia belonged to the FRG and part to the GDR
between 1949 and 1990, and not all regions of the later GDR belonged to Prus-
sia.
2.2 The Data
The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual household panel,
started in West Germany in 1984. From 1990 on, it also covers the territory
of the former German Democratic Republic. We use the original sample estab-
lished in 1984, and the sub-sample covering the territory of the former GDR
started in 1990. The original West German sample leaves us with around 11,400
year-person observations, while the East German sample covers around 7,000
year-person observations for 1997 and 2002.8
In 1997 and 2002, respondents were asked questions concerning their prefer-
ences for the role of the state in diﬀerent areas of social security. The question
reads: “At present, a multitude of social services are provided not only by the
state but also by private free market enterprises, organizations, associations, or
6Note that some regions transcend later borders, in which case we assign the region to
East, West or outside Germany depending on its largest share.
7The non-population weighted average income in later East regions amounted to 1,203
Mark in 1928, 877 Mark in 1932, and 1,169 Mark in 1936, while the corresponding incomes
for the later West regions are 1,203, 913, and 1,200 Mark.
8The number of observations varies slightly with the dependent variable.
5private citizens. What is your opinion on this? Who should be responsible for
the following areas?”. We use the answers to all areas that concern ﬁnancial se-
curity, namely “ﬁnancial security in case of unemployment”, “ﬁnancial security
in case of illness”, “ﬁnancial security of families”, “ﬁnancial security for old-
age”, and “ﬁnancial security for persons needing care”. The answers are given
on a scale of 1 to 5, which correspond to “only the state”, “mostly the state”,
“state and private forces”, “mostly private forces”, and “only private forces”.
We group the ﬁrst 2 answer categories together to represent individuals with
preference for an active role of the state in providing for its citizens, and group
the last 3 answer categories together to represent individuals with preferences
for private forces. Hence, we create 5 new dummy variables which take on the
value of 1 if the respondent answered “only the state” or “mostly the state” for
the respective area, and 0 otherwise. This is mainly done to ease the interpreta-
tion of the coeﬃcients. As a robustness check, we run ordered probit regressions
on the original variables, and the results do not change signiﬁcantly.9
Our explanatory variable of main interest is an East dummy that takes on
the value of 1 if the respondent lived in East Germany before reuniﬁcation,
regardless of the current place of residence. Hence, this dummy captures people
who lived under communism before 1990. The baseline controls include age,
gender, marital status, labor force status, and occupation of the respondent,
the number of children and the number of adults in the household, as well as
the annual household income. All monetary variables are in DM and inﬂated
to 2002.
We analyze two additional questions that capture the belief of the respon-
dent regarding important driving forces of success in life. In 1996 and 1999,
GSOEP asked the following question: “The following statements express vary-
ing attitudes towards life and the future. Please state whether you totally agree,
agree slightly, disagree slightly, or totally disagree”, followed by several state-
ments that diﬀer between 1996 and 1999. The ﬁrst statement we use refers to
the role of luck in life. We create a dummy variable “luck” that takes on the
value of 1 if the respondent agreed totally or slightly with the statements “No
one can escape their fate, everything in life happens as it must happen” in 1996
and “What one achieves in life is mainly a question of luck or fate” in 1999.10
Similarly, the dummy variable ”social conditions” takes on the value 1 if the
respondent agreed totally or slightly with the statement “The possibilities in
my life are determined by the social conditions”.11
2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports the basic summary statistics regarding the ﬁve questions that we
use as dependent variables.12 This cross tabulation already highlights several
9The basic results using ordered probits are shown in Table A2 in Appendix. All other
results are available from the authors upon request.
10We take the average of both questions to alleviate potential measurement error.
11This question was asked in 1999. There is no equivalent statement in 1996.
12Table A1 in the appendix shows summary statistics for all independent variables.
6important facts. First, a larger proportion of East Germans than West Germans
f a v o ra na c t i v er o l eo ft h es t a t e .T h ed i ﬀerence is substantial in all categories.
Second, in 2002 East and West Germans looked more alike than in 1997. The
East-West diﬀerence in the percentage of individuals favoring an active state
role amounts to between 16 and 18 percentage points in 1997, and between 9
and 14 percentage points in 2002. Third, this convergence arises mostly from
changing preferences of East Germans. In all questions, the percentage of East
Germans favoring an active role of the state is declining between 1997 and 2002.
Last, and this is somewhat more surprising, the support of West Germans for
the welfare state is increasing between 1997 and 2002 in 3 out of the 5 categories,
namely regarding unemployment, sickness, and care.
This table also reports summary statistics for the two questions concerning
beliefs about what determines success in life, namely individual eﬀort against
luck and/or social conditions. The interesting ﬁnding here is that East Germans
are overwhelmingly convinced that social conditions determine success, more so
than West Germans. Moreover, they believe less than West Germans in an
important role of luck. In other words, East Germans seem to believe much
more than West Germans that somebody’s life is deﬁned by social conditions,
a basic tenet of the Marxist way of thinking.
Table 3 shows the income per capita and the unemployment rates in German
states (Bundesländer), as well as transfers per capita that each state receives
from other states and the federal government in line with the German ﬁnancial
transfer system (see the appendix for an overview of the German transfer sys-
tem). Average income per capita in the East is around 80% of the average West
income, and the unemployment rate is roughly twice as large. As we discussed
above, before WWII per capita income levels in East and West Germany were
virtually identical. The 20 percent diﬀerence in per capita income after reuniﬁ-
cation can be interpreted as the eﬀect of communism on economic development.
The lower income levels as well as the higher unemployment rates lead to the
fact that all Eastern German states are net recipient of transfers. Among the
Western German states, ﬁve are net givers, while four are net recipients. Yet,
with the exception of the small state of Bremen, the average transfer received
is much larger in the East than among the net recipients in the West.
3 Basic Results
Table 4 reports our basic speciﬁcations, in which we control for many individual
characteristics and for our variable of interest, being from the East. As we
discussed above, the left hand side variable is deﬁned as a 0/1 variable with 1
meaning support for an active state role. We also rerun all these regressions
using the entire ﬁve point scale, and the results are consistent. Table A2 in
the appendix is the same as Table 4, but the left hand side variable has the
ﬁve point scale, and an ordered probit estimation is conducted. In the main
text, we report the results from probit regressions for ease of interpretation.
The coeﬃcients reported in the tables are the total coeﬃcients. We report the
7corresponding marginal coeﬃcients in the text when we are interpreting the
size of the coeﬃcients. The marginal coeﬃcients of interaction variables are
calculated as the cross partial derivatives (Ai and Norton, 2003).
The ﬁrst three explanatory variables are the critical ones; and for all the ﬁve
questions they behave similarly. Consider column 1, which concerns unemploy-
ment. An East German is signiﬁcantly more likely to have preferences for state
provision of ﬁnancial security for the unemployed than a West German. Over
time, however, the East Germans are becoming less pro state, since the interac-
tion between being from the East and the 2002 dummy (the third variable) is
negative and statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of being an East German and
the interaction of that with 2002 have similar coeﬃcients on all questions. The
coeﬃcients on the East indicator variable vary from 0.36 to 0.41, and are hence
rather uniform. The interaction of East with 2002 (a rough measure of con-
vergence) varies from -0.06 to -0.18. The economic meaning of these numbers
is as follows.13 Being from the East increases the probability of favoring state
intervention by between 14 and 16 percentage points in 1997, compared to being
from the West. Between 1997 and 2002, the probability of favoring state inter-
vention for an East German declines by between 2.5 and 5.8 percentage points.
Given that these questions are reported at a 5 year interval (1997 and 2002), a
very rough measure of convergence would imply full uniformity of views from a
minimum of about 15 years (column 5) to a maximum of 30 years in column 3.
Given that the ﬁrst survey was taken 7 years after reuniﬁcation, the complete
cycle of convergence (assuming that it is linear) would be between roughly 20
and 40 years, depending on the question; roughly one to two generations.14
The dummy for 2002 captures the change in preferences of a West German
between 1997 and 2002. Note that it is signiﬁcantly positive, indicating that
Westerners are becoming more pro government, for 3 of the 5 regressions. In
none of the ﬁve regressions is there signiﬁcant evidence that West Germans are
becoming less pro government.
The estimates on individual controls yield reasonable results. Men are gen-
erally less pro government (although not consistently on all questions). Larger
families, both in terms of number of children and number of adults, are more
favorable to government intervention, not surprisingly, since they get more ben-
eﬁts. Interestingly, civil servants have weaker preferences than others for gov-
ernment intervention for the unemployed, probably because they have very high
job security. On the contrary, those who are unemployed strongly prefer govern-
ment intervention for unemployed. Income enters negatively and is statistically
signiﬁcant on all questions; the wealthy beneﬁt less from government interven-
tion and pay more for it. Self employed are less pro government either because
13The marginal eﬀect on y of a dummy variable x has been calculated as E [y|x =1 ]−
E [y|x =0 ] .
14Our results are based on unweighted observations. If we use the sample weights provided
by GSOEP, the results are very similar. The only diﬀerence worth mentioning is that the
convergence results become weaker, indicating an even longer process of convergence. However,
when we include wealth variables as controls (as described at the end of this section), the
convergence results are again very similar to the unweighted results.
8they beneﬁt less from redistribution, or because being self employed is correlated
with a more individualistic vision of the world and/or with less risk aversion.15
All these variables are always included in all our regressions and the coeﬃcients
are quite stable. From now on, we do not report them to avoid cluttering the
tables.
Our data set also includes two variables which proxy for wealth. One is
the amount of interest and dividend income obtained by the household of the
respondent; the second is whether or not the household owns the house it lives
in. When we add these variables in the regressions of Table 4, our results on
the East-West diﬀerences remain virtually unchanged, and the coeﬃcients on
the two wealth variables have the expected sign and are statistically signiﬁcant.
These results are reported in table A3 in the appendix. We do not include these
two wealth controls in our basic regressions because of data availability. After
the inclusion of these variables, we lose around 2,200 observations because of
non respondence. For robustness, we checked all our results including these two
variables, in addition to those of Table 4, and the results are robust. These
results are available upon request.
3.1 Age eﬀects
Let us now consider more closely the eﬀects of the number of years under Com-
munism on individual preferences. Table 5 shows some striking results. Consider
column 1.16 The variable “age” corresponds to the age of the respondent. The
East indicator variable interacted with age is positive, meaning that older former
East Germans are more favorable to state intervention. Note how age not inter-
acted with East is negative, meaning that West Germans are becoming less pro
government as they become older, the same result found for the US by Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005).17 The eﬀect of age on preferences is exactly opposite in
East and West. The same pattern applies to all other questions. The obvious
interpretation of this strikingly diﬀerent age patterns between East Germans
and West Germans is that while age tends to make individuals less pro govern-
ment in West Germany, this eﬀect is more than compensated by the fact that
elderly East Germans have lived longer under communism.
Table 6 pushes this age analysis further by looking at ﬁve diﬀerent groups
of birth cohort. The ﬁve groups are deﬁned as follows: youngest are those born
after 1975, young are those born between 1961 and 1975, middle are those born
between 1946 and 1960, old are those born between 1931 and 1945, and oldest
are those born on or before 1930. Note that the youngest group did only spend
their childhood and early adolescence under communism; this is the omitted
group in the regressions. This table shows that the older are progressively
15All these results on individual controls are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the
US by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
16In the regressions of this table we do not include the variables age squared and age cubed
to facilitate the comparison of the age eﬀect.
17This result coincides with the famous quote “A man who is not a socialist at age 20 has
no heart; a man who is still a socialist at age 40 has no brain”, that has been attributed to
Georges Clemenceau, George Bernard Shaw, and Winston Churchill, among others.
9more pro government than the younger in the East, a pattern not observed in
the West in which in fact the older tend to be less pro government than the
younger. Interestingly, for some of the questions the old rather than the oldest
group in the East shows the maximum support of government. Note that the
old ones are the group with the maximum time of the working life spent under
Communism, since they were at least 15 years old at the end of World War II.
The quantitative implications of the birth cohort eﬀects are large. Figure 1
represents the results from Table 6 in a diﬀe r e n tw a y ;i ts h o w sb yh o wm a n y
percentage points an East German of a certain cohort group is more likely
to favor state intervention than a West German of the same cohort group.
While an East German from the youngest group is only between 3 (column 4)
and 11 (column 1) percentage points more likely to be in favor of government
redistribution than a West German of the same group, an East German born
before 1945 is between 21 percentage points (column 1) and 49 percentage points
(column 4) more likely than a West German of the same cohortgroup to believe
in government redistribution.
3.2 Decomposition of change over time
Given that we observe that older East Germans are more in favor of redistri-
bution than younger ones, the question arises whether the observed decline in
East Germans’ preferences for redistribution between 1997 and 2002 is simply
a result of a shift in the cohort composition, or whether it is caused by chang-
ing personal preferences of East Germans. Even if personal preferences were
constant over time, we would expect that East German preferences converge
on average to West German preferences as older East Germans die and East
Germany becomes populated by relatively younger households who have spent
less time of their life under communism.
To investigate the relative importance of both eﬀects, in Table 7 we report
results from the baseline regressions in which we include only individuals who
answer the relevant questions in both 1997 and 2002.18 Hence, all eﬀects of
a change in preferences between 1997 and 2002 are due to changing personal
preferences, and not due to changes in the cohort composition. The interaction
eﬀect between East and year 2002 is still negative in all 5 regressions, and
signiﬁcant in all cases except ﬁnancial security of families (column 3). However,
the East time eﬀect is now on average substantially smaller than in the baseline
regressions, declining in absolute terms by between 0% (column 1), and 70%
(column 3). On average, the East time eﬀect is around 35% smaller than the
eﬀect reported in the baseline results in Table 4. Hence, we conclude that
around 2/3 of the convergence arises from actual convergence of preferences,
while around one third arises from changes in the cohort composition.19
18Note that we use an unbalanced sample for the general results.
19The number of observation drops by around 22% if we restrict the sample to those indi-
viduals who answer in both 1997 and 2002. Note that the decline in the sample size is not
random. While in general we use only Eastern households that were added to the survey in
1990 and hence should in principle answer the survey in both 1997 and 2002, some members of
103.3 The Eﬀect of Communism: Poverty or Preferences?
3.3.1 Individual economic eﬀects
The poor tend to favor government intervention more than the rich. In fact
in our regressions we always include the logarithmic household income of the
respondent as a control, and the coeﬃcient on this variable is always negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, we are measuring the eﬀects of having been
in the East controlling for the fact that the respondent’s income might be lower
precisely because he or she lived in the East. In order to allow for further
non-linearities between income and preferences, we also include a fourth order
polynomial of household income instead of the logarithm of household income,
and our estimates remain almost unchanged.20
I no r d e rt oc a p t u r et h ee x t e n tt ow h i c hah o u s e h o l dc u r r e n t l yb e n e ﬁts from
redistribution, in Table 8 we include as explanatory variable the share of house-
hold income that comes from government sources, which we call household gov-
ernment transfer ratio.21 One would expect a positive eﬀect of this variable
on redistribution; in fact, the coeﬃcient is sometimes positive and signiﬁcant
(column 3), sometimes negative and signiﬁcant (column 2), and sometimes in-
signiﬁcant. Most importantly, the inclusion of this variable leaves the estimated
East eﬀects almost unchanged. In addition to current income, expected future
income may explain preferences for redistribution; individuals who expect to
rise in the social ladder may oppose redistributive policies which might remain
in place for several years22. As a rough measure of the eﬀects of expected future
income we check whether the growth in income of a respondent between 1997
and 2002 eﬀects his/her preferences in 1997. This is a rough test of course,
which implies perfect forecasts. The future growth rate of income between 1997
and 2002 has a negative eﬀect on preferences in 1997, but again its inclusion
leaves the estimates of the East dummy almost unchanged (Table 9).
3.3.2 Aggregate economic eﬀects
In addition to personal income, however, there might be an aggregate income
eﬀect; individuals living in regions poorer than average may prefer government
intervention because of the active redistribution from richer to poorer regions,
which in fact takes place in Germany.
In Table 10 we include the average per capita income and unemployment
rate of the state of residence, as well as transfers received or paid by the state;
note that we continue to include as always the income of the respondent. The
the household might choose not to answer one of the relevant questions in either 1997 and 2002
(which should be random), and some members of the households become adults between 1997
and 2002, and hence answer the personal questionnaire in 2002, but not in 1997. Therefore,
on average the sample should comprise more persons of recent birth cohorts in 2002 than in
1997, which makes the convergence eﬀect for East stronger given the estimated cohort eﬀects.
20Results are available from the authors upon request.
21We calculated this share by adding up personal income from government and non-
government sources respectively over the members of a household.
22On this point see Benabou and Ok (2001) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
11level of per capita income turns out never to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect. The re-
gional unemployment rate has a weak positive inﬂuence on preferences for state
intervention; it is only signiﬁcant in the question regarding the unemployed.
Financial transfers have signiﬁcant positive predictive power for preferences for
state intervention for the unemployed, as well as for people requiring care. After
including these three regional controls, in the regression regarding the unem-
ployed the coeﬃcient on the East indicator variable drops from 0.41 to 0.28.
This suggests that part of the East eﬀe c te s t i m a t e da b o v eh a dt od ow i t hE a s t
German states beneﬁtting ﬁnancially from redistribution. A similar pattern oc-
curs with all the other questions. Thus, up to one third of the ”East eﬀect” can
be explained by the fact that the East became poorer during Communism and
is now a net beneﬁciary of redistribution within Germany, rather than to an
eﬀect of Communism on preferences. The respondents’ preferences for public
intervention are inﬂuenced by economic eﬀects in the region where they live,
but even after controlling for that, we still ﬁnd a large eﬀect of being from the
East.
3.4 Migration and preferences
So far, we have treated all East Germans as one homogeneous group. Yet, 7
percent of East Germans in our sample have migrated to the West. In Table
11, we add the dummy variable “East living in East”, which takes on the value
of 1 if an East German lives in the territory of the former East Germany in the
observation year, and 0 otherwise.23
The coeﬃcient on the East-dummy now captures the preferences of an East
German living in the West. As the table shows, East Germans living in the West
are more in favor of government intervention than West Germans. However,
East Germans living in the East are at least twice as much in favor of government
intervention than East Germans who moved to the West. This result can be
interpreted in two ways. First, it could be that, having lived among West
Germans for some time, preferences of East Germans who moved to the West
have converged faster than preferences of East Germans who stayed in the East.
Second, those that migrated to the West could be a self-selected group that had
lower preferences for state intervention to begin with. Note e.g. that the average
age of East respondents who moved to the West is 34, while the average age of
East respondents who stayed in the East is 45.
With regard to convergence, one can observe that all the convergence in
preferences between 1997 and 2002 is driven by East Germans who stayed in
the East. The preferences of East Germans who moved to the West do not
23We also estimated a model in which we include instead a dummy variable “East residence”
that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent lives in the East in the observation year, regardless
of whether the respondent is from the former East or the former West, as well as interactions
of this variable with the East dummy, the year 2002 dummy, and their interaction (results
are available from the authors upon request). While this is a better modeling approach, the
interpretation of the results is more complicated. Since only 0.6% of the West Germans in
our sample live in the East, we hence decided to refrain from splitting the West Germans
according to current residence. Results do not change signiﬁcantly.
12change in a statistically signiﬁcant way between 1997 and 2002. Again, there
are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. It could be that pref-
erences of East Germans who moved to the West converged initially, but that
they have reached their new steady-state level by 2002. In this case, we should
not expect full convergence either for East Germans staying in the East. On
the other hand, it could be that those East Germans who moved to the West
not only had diﬀerent preferences at the time of migration, but that their pref-
erences also exhibit diﬀerent convergence patterns. In the case of preferences
regarding ﬁnancial security when unemployed and ﬁnancial security of families,
East Germans who moved to the West even become more pro state over time,
although this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant;24 this might be interpreted as
a backlash of preferences after experiencing life in the West.
3.5 Regional diﬀerences
In order to gain further insides whether the measured eﬀects really capture the
eﬀect of communism, we analyze regional diﬀerences in the eﬀect. We would
expect the eﬀect of communism to be relatively homogenous across Eastern
states. Hence, we would be worried if the “East” eﬀect on preferences were
very heterogeneous across Eastern states, and especially if it were mostly driven
by one or two single states. Hence, we rerun our baseline regression including
separate dummies for all 5 Eastern states plus East Berlin instead of one single
East dummy. Note that, consistent with the East dummy, these dummies refer
to the state of residence at the time of reuniﬁcation.
As the results in Table 12 show, the coeﬃcients on the Eastern state dummies
are positive and signiﬁcant in all states. Moreover, they are of similar size across
the states. The only slight outlier that emerges is the state of Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, which is in 4 out of 5 cases more pro private forces than the
other Eastern states, although it is still relatively pro-government compared
with West Germany. With regard to convergence, the results are a little bit
more heterogeneous. However, only 5 out of 30 coeﬃcients on the interaction
term between an East German state and the year 2002 turn out not to be
negative, while 15 of the 30 coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly negative. Every state
shows signiﬁcant convergence in at least 1 of the 5 questions.
We conclude that the eﬀect of Communism on preferences, as well as con-
vergence of preferences over time, can be found in every single East German
state, and are not driven by outliers.
4 Social conditions, individual eﬀort and luck
Why do former East Germans favor state intervention? One possibility is that
they are used to think (partly because of the inﬂuence of Communist ideology)
that it is “society’s fault” if people are poor, unemployed or in need of help.
24The associated p-values are 0.17 and 0.38.
13If the individual is not responsible, but society is, then society (i.e. the state)
should take care of these problems.
In Table 13 we report a regression in which the left hand side is a variable that
takes the value of 1 if the respondent believes that social conditions determine
individual possibilities in life. In column 1, we ﬁnd a strong eﬀect from being
from the East. The probability of believing in the inﬂuence of social conditions
is 10 percentage points higher for an East German than a West German. The
coeﬃcients on individual characteristics seem reasonable. Men believe less in
social conditions than women, unemployed believe more in social conditions,
self employed much less etc. In the next column we interact the East indicator
variable with the age of the respondent and ﬁnd, once again, a strong age
eﬀect.25 Older East Germans are more likely to believe in social conditions
as major determinants of individual fortunes than younger East Germans. We
interpret this as the eﬀect of having lived longer under a Communist regime. In
the West, the age eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Table 14 however shows that the eﬀect of having lived in the East goes well
beyond these beliefs about social conditions. In this table (where as always
we control for all individual characteristics), we repeat the baseline regression
including the dummy variable capturing beliefs in an important role of social
conditions as control. While the variable capturing the beliefs about social
conditions has a signiﬁcantly positive inﬂuence on preferences for an active state
role, the East indicator variables are still signiﬁcant and only slightly smaller
than in the baseline results in Table 4. Thus, even after controlling for beliefs
regarding social conditions, former East Germans believe in state intervention
more than former West Germans.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) an Alesina and Glaeser (2004) ﬁnd that those
who believe that luck determines wealth and success in life are more pro redis-
tribution than those who belief that mostly individual eﬀort is responsible for
success.26 W ep u r s u et h i sl i n eh e r ea sw e l l .T a b l e1 5s h o w sar e g r e s s i o ni nw h i c h
t h el e f th a n ds i d ev a r i a b l ei sd e ﬁned as 1 if the respondent believes that luck
determines individual fortunes. The East indicator variable is now negative. If
we put this result together with that of Table 13, it appears that East Germans
believe more than West Germans that individuals (being their eﬀort or their
luck) matter less than social conditions in determining success or failure in life.
Column 2 shows no age eﬀect for East Germans beyond the positive age eﬀect
also observed for West Germans.27 Table 16 shows that those who belief that
luck matters a lot in determining individual success are more favorable to gov-
ernment intervention. Not surprisingly, given the lower belief in the role of luck
by East Germans, the inclusion of this variable has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
east indicator variable.
25As in table 5, we omit higher order terms of age as controls in this regression.
26Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2004) present models seeking to
explain the equilibrium redsitributive policies as a function of individual beliefs about luck
and eﬀort as determinants of success.
27Again, we omit higher order terms of age as controls in this regression.
145 Final remarks
We ﬁnd that East Germans belief signiﬁcantly more so than West Germans that
the state should be responsible for the ﬁnancial security of diﬀerent vulnerable
groups in society, namely the unemployed, the sick, families, the old, and people
requiring care. According to our results, it will take about one to two generations
(20 to 40 years) for an average East German to have the same views on the role
of the government in society than a West German.
The diﬀerence in preferences between former East and West Germans is
due in large part to the direct eﬀect of communism. This eﬀect could arise
due to indoctrination, e.g. in public schools, or simply due to becoming used
to an intrusive public sector. A second, indirect eﬀect of communism is that
by making former East Germany poorer than West Germany, it has made the
former more dependent on redistribution and therefore more favorable to it. The
implication of our ﬁndings is that former West Germany has received a major
“political shock”, in the sense that the new members of the uniﬁed Germany
are much more favorable to state intervention. This shock has potentially long-
lasting eﬀects, since we ﬁnd that preferences need one to two generations to
converge. One caveat to this conclusion, however, is that since we could use
only two survey years, namely 1997 and 2002, we could only estimate a linear
convergence eﬀect. It is possible that the speed of convergence may increase
or decrease. Certainly, even 15 years after reuniﬁcation former East Germans
continue to view the role of the state in economic life as much more essential
than the former West Germans, not exactly a population of libertarians.
In evaluating these results, one always has to wonder whether or not these
survey answers are meaningful, namely whether they reﬂect what individuals
truly believe. We are quite conﬁdent that they truly reﬂect preferences for
two reasons. First, the basic correlations of the answers with variables like
income, wealth, and labor force status are consistent with obvious individual
cost/beneﬁt analyses. Second, evidence on voting behavior in East and West
over the observation period is consistent with the picture emerging from this
survey. Table A4 shows the share of votes obtained by various parties in the
diﬀerent states in the elections for the federal parliament (Bundestagswahlen)
in 1998 and 2002. In this table, the parties are ordered from left to right to
coincide with their position in the political spectrum. Thus, the ﬁrst column
shows the vote share per state of the most leftist party, the PDS (Partei des
Demokratischen Sozialismus) ,w h i c hi si ne ﬀect the successor party of the SED
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), the ruling party in the GDR. In
1998, the percentage of votes received by this party was about 20 per cent in
the East, but only around 1 to 2 per cent in the West; it was around 10 per
cent in Berlin, which includes both former East and former West Berlin. This
is consistent with our ﬁnding of a much more pro state, left leaning population
in the East, as captured by the survey. Also, comparing the 2002 and 1998
elections, we see how the percentage of the PDS votes in the East shrinks sub-
stantially, presumably in favor of the SPD, the main center left party, whose
share increases almost identically to the reduction in votes for the PDS. This
15indicates a movement away from the communist leaning left toward the center
of the political spectrum, and shows a convergence of the East to the West.
This voting behavior is therefore consistent with the preferences regarding state
intervention expressed by the respondents of the survey.
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17Appendix
A German regional transfer system
German federalism is a complicated structure, with many legislative areas and
taxes shared between the federal government and the states. Realizing the
diﬀerent economic powers of the states, the need for an equalization scheme
was written down in the West German constitution in 1949. In 1993, federal
and state governments reformed the system to administer massive monetary
ﬂows into the new Eastern German states. The new system (Solidarpakt I)w a s
established in 1995, and scheduled to expire at the end of 2004. In response to
the still signiﬁcant economic needs of the Eastern German states, the federal
and state governments negotiated an extension of the system (Solidarpakt II)i n
2001, which started to become eﬀective in 2005 and is scheduled to expire at the
end of 2019. Through the new system, the Eastern German states will receive
a total of 306 billion DM (i.e. 156 billion Euro) over a period of 15 years.
The ﬁnancial equalization scheme between the federal government and the
states (Länderﬁnanzausgleich) comprises a horizontal and a vertical component.
In the horizontal component, the ﬁnancial needs and ﬁnancial resources of any
given state are determined via speciﬁc formulas. Based on these calculations,
it is decided whether a given state should receive extra ﬁnancial resources, or
should share its resources with other states. The ﬁnancial ﬂows between the
states in this step sum up to zero.28 In the subsequent vertical component,
certain states receive additional ﬁnancial resources from the federal government
(Bundesergänzungszuweisungen). On top of that, since 1995 the Eastern Ger-
man states have received special support from the federal government based on
the “law for the promotion of investment in Eastern Germany” (Investitions-
förderungsgesetz Aufbau Ost). Last, the debt of the East German government
was taken over by the Western German states. This led to annual interest and
amortization payments by only the Western states (Fonds Deutsche Einheit).
In Table 3, we report the transfers per capita in DM for every state in 1997 and
2002, adding the vertical and the horizontal component of the Länderﬁnanzaus-
gleich,a sw e l la st h eﬂows based on the Investitionsförderungsgesetz29 and the
Fonds Deutsche Einheit.30
28In a preceding step, the receipts from value added taxes are divided between the states.
75% of the receipts are divided based on the number of inhabitants, while 25% of the receipts
are divided according to a formula that takes the ﬁnancial needs of the states into account.
Hence, this procedure leads to some implicit ﬂows between states. Unfortunately, we were not
able to obtain the amounts of these implicit transfers.
29Since 2002, these ﬂows have become part of the Bundesergänzungszuweisungen, and hence
they have only been added in 1997.
30Note that results are unchanged when we omit the Fonds Deutsche Einheit in calculating
the transfers.
18Table 1: Average per capita income 1928, 1932, and 1936 by region 
  
  
1928           
 (in 1928 Mark) 
1932  
(in 1928 Mark) 
1936 
(in 1928 Mark) 
Prussia 1,174  869  1,161 
  Provinz East-Prussia  814  673  849 
  Stadt Berlin (E/W)  1,822  1311  1,895 
  Provinz Brandenburg (E)  1,140  917  1,158 
  Provinz Pommern  921  721  967 
  Grenzmark Posen/West-Prussia  837  649  781 
  Niederschlesien  1,057  804  953 
  Oberschlesien  850  599  758 
  Sachsen (E)  1,155  844  1,161 
  Schleswig-Holstein (W)  1,164  938  1,192 
  Hannover (W)  1,069  859  1,156 
  Westfalen (W)  1,080  755  1,045 
  Hessen-Nassau (W)  1,226  963  1,140 
  Rheinprovinz (W)  1,218  857  1,171 
      
Bayern (W)  1,041  785  1,049 
Sachsen (E)  1,423  964  1,270 
Württemberg (W)  1,183  1015  1,348 
Baden (W)  1,135  859  1,117 
Thüringen (E)  1,095  784  1,087 
Hessen (W)  1,158  797  1,039 
Hamburg (W)  1,754  1304  1,746 
Other Länder  1,155  913  1,314 
Deutsches Reich  1,185  875  1,173 
  
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich, various issues 
 
  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
  
West sample  East Sample  year variable 
Obs. Per  cent Obs. Per  cent 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when unemployed 
(state=1)  6,104 63.24% 3,735 78.85%
Responsibility for the financial 
security when sick (state=1)  6,105 34.50% 3,728 52.76%
Responsibility for the financial 
security of the family (state=1) 6,095 32.78% 3,732 49.06%
Responsibility for the financial 
security when old (state=1)  6,110 38.46% 3,737 56.09%
1997 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when requiring care 
(state=1)  6,110 40.77% 3,737 56.44%
Responsibility for the financial 
security when unemployed 
(state=1) 5,307 65.33% 3,343 76.64%
Responsibility for the financial 
security when sick (state=1)  5,309 40.01% 3,345 51.81%
Responsibility for the financial 
security of the family (state=1) 5,311 32.10% 3,347 45.65%
Responsibility for the financial 
security when old (state=1)  5,319 36.70% 3,350 48.51%
2002 
Responsibility for the financial 
security when requiring care 
(state=1)  5,313 44.27% 3,354 53.04%
  
West sample  East Sample  year variable 
Obs. Per  cent Obs. Per  cent 
Life achievements determined 
by luck or effort (luck=1)  6,555 40.23% 4,070 31.40%
1997 
Social conditions define 
possibilities (agree=1) 5,523 60.44% 3,465 72.41%
  
Table 3: Average income per capita, unemployment rates, and transfers by states 
  
  
Average income per 
capita (in DM) 
Unemployment 
rates (in %) 
Transfers per capita  
(in DM) 
   1997* 2002  1997  2002  1997*  2002 
Berlin 28,830  28,528  17.3  16.9  2,922  3,020 
WEST            
Baden-Württemberg  32,621 34,843 8.7 5.4 -249 -305 
Bayern  32,011 33,895 8.7 6.0 -276 -325 
Bremen 35,588  37,231  16.8  12.6  3,912  3,458 
Hamburg 35,056  36,709  13.0  9.0  -172  -223 
Hessen 30,683  32,803  10.4  6.9  -559  -614 
Niedersachsen 30,149  31,473  12.9  9.2  285  319 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 32,198  34,168  12.2  9.2  -182  -176 
Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland  29,625  31,329  11.0  7.6  720  649 
Schleswig-Holstein 31,178  31,655  11.2  8.7  132  278 
EAST            
Brandenburg 26,288  28,047  18.9  17.5  1,889  1,793 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 24,878  26,834  20.3  18.6  2,067  2,016 
Sachsen 25,867  28,099  18.4  17.8  1,912  1,893 
Sachsen-Anhalt 25,227  27,313  21.7  19.6  1,998  1,985 
Thüringen 25,338  27,941  19.1  15.9  2,015  1,954 
  
* Values adjusted for inflation 
  
Table 4: Basic regression 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east    0.414 0.029 0.406 0.027 0.405 0.027 0.399 0.027 0.362 0.027 
year02    0.068 0.023 0.170 0.023 -0.009 0.024 -0.027 0.023 0.105 0.023 
east*year02  -0.124 0.039 -0.163 0.036 -0.063 0.036 -0.146 0.036 -0.177 0.036 
                
age    -0.034 0.014 -0.018 0.014 -0.022 0.014 -0.034 0.014 -0.011 0.014 
age squared (*10
3)  0.745 0.283 0.375 0.277 0.473 0.278 0.709 0.273 0.095 0.272 
age cubed (*10
3)  -0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.002  -0.0001  0.002 
male    -0.088 0.022 -0.083 0.021 -0.014 0.022 -0.031 0.022 0.014 0.021 
number  of  children  0.034 0.014 0.035 0.012 0.064 0.012 0.059 0.036 0.109 0.036 
number  of  adults  0.026 0.013 0.049 0.012 0.026 0.011 0.038 0.012 0.011 0.012 
married    0.079 0.038 0.109 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.043 0.011 0.008 0.011 
divorced    0.095 0.054 0.042 0.052 0.020 0.052 0.063 0.052 0.101 0.050 
married  but  separated  0.028 0.088 -0.008 0.084 -0.031 0.084 0.096 0.084 0.176 0.085 
widowed    -0.034 0.059 0.053 0.057 -0.020 0.058 -0.005 0.056 0.064 0.056 
log(household  income)  -0.171 0.026 -0.285 0.025 -0.149 0.024 -0.244 0.024 -0.154 0.024 
civilservant    -0.165 0.056 -0.278 0.058 0.071 0.058 -0.114 0.058 -0.132 0.054 
self-employed    -0.338 0.052 -0.433 0.052 -0.340 0.052 -0.477 0.052 -0.316 0.051 
white-collar  worker  -0.056 0.032 -0.082 0.030 -0.004 0.031 -0.126 0.030 -0.114 0.030 
unemployed    0.153 0.051 -0.008 0.047 0.135 0.047 -0.007 0.046 -0.039 0.046 
retired    -0.088 0.059 -0.108 0.057 0.137 0.057 -0.001 0.056 0.002 0.056 
maternity    -0.005 0.079 -0.080 0.077 0.098 0.075 -0.229 0.076 -0.093 0.075 
nonworking    -0.037 0.043 -0.034 0.042 0.153 0.042 -0.024 0.041 0.016 0.041 
training    -0.033 0.064 0.003 0.061 -0.079 0.063 -0.056 0.061 -0.004 0.061 
other  nonworking  -0.007 0.051 -0.099 0.049 0.068 0.049 -0.052 0.048 -0.099 0.048 
constant  2.165 0.293 2.113 0.283 0.924 0.280 2.143 0.280 1.284 0.276 
                
obs  18,489  18,487  18,485  18,516  18,514    
log likelihood  -11,070     -12,208     -11,964     -12,265     -12,571    
  
  
Table 5: Regressions with east*age interaction 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east    0.029 0.064 -0.035 0.060 -0.032 0.060 -0.225 0.060 0.002 0.059 
year02    0.075 0.023 0.178 0.023 -0.001 0.024 -0.016 0.023 0.111 0.023 
east*year02  -0.140 0.039 -0.179 0.036 -0.077 0.036 -0.171 0.036 -0.191 0.036 
age  -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 0.001 
east*age  0.009 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.008 0.001 
const  1.796 0.213 2.031 0.202 0.818 0.199 1.909 0.200 1.293 0.197 
             
obs  18,489  18,487  18,485  18,516  18,514    
log likelihood  -11,047     -12,170     -11,928     -12,191     -12,546    
 
 
 
Table 6: Regressions with cohorts interacted with east  
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
east    0.316 0.068 0.239 0.063 0.141 0.064 0.075 0.064 0.204 0.064 
year02    0.069 0.026 0.166 0.026 -0.042 0.027 -0.061 0.026 0.107 0.025 
east*year02  -0.114 0.039 -0.141 0.037 -0.037 0.037 -0.112 0.036 -0.159 0.036 
young  0.014 0.074 0.015 0.070 -0.210 0.072 -0.218 0.072 -0.030 0.070 
middle  -0.085 0.100 -0.054 0.095 -0.429 0.097 -0.383 0.096 -0.084 0.094 
old  -0.067 0.127 -0.104 0.122 -0.492 0.124 -0.518 0.123 -0.098 0.119 
oldest  -0.022 0.154 -0.117 0.148 -0.431 0.151 -0.484 0.150 -0.019 0.146 
young*east  -0.118 0.075 -0.008 0.070 0.111 0.071 0.109 0.071 0.002 0.071 
middle*east  0.139 0.077 0.145 0.072 0.270 0.073 0.276 0.073 0.136 0.072 
old*east  0.329 0.081 0.355 0.075 0.480 0.075 0.603 0.076 0.349 0.075 
oldest*east  0.285 0.098 0.431 0.090 0.437 0.090 0.724 0.091 0.379 0.090 
const  2.006 0.355 2.220 0.342 0.628 0.341 1.993 0.341 1.204 0.334 
                    
obs  18,489  18,487  18,485  18,516  18,514     
log likelihood  -11,034     -12,172     -11,919     -12,183     -12,538    
  
  
 
Table 7: Regressions with individuals who answer in 1997 and 2002 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east    0.421 0.034 0.373 0.032 0.389 0.032 0.372 0.032 0.322 0.032 
year02    0.053 0.026 0.166 0.026 -0.026 0.027 -0.028 0.026 0.098 0.026 
east*year02  -0.126 0.043 -0.109 0.040 -0.018 0.040 -0.080 0.040 -0.126 0.040 
const  1.946 0.365 2.216 0.356 0.772 0.352 2.222 0.353 1.468 0.348 
                    
obs  14,433  14,434  14,471  14,449  14,451    
log  likelihood  -8,623  -9,532  -9,372  -9,555  -9,808    
  
 
 
Table 8: Regressions with household government transfer ratio 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
household government transfer 
ratio  0.031 0.045 -0.071 0.043 0.076 0.042 -0.062 0.043 0.018 0.042 
east    0.411 0.030 0.407 0.028 0.403 0.028 0.396 0.028 0.362 0.028 
year02    0.064 0.023 0.164 0.023 -0.014 0.024 -0.034 0.024 0.101 0.023 
east*year02  -0.117 0.039 -0.162 0.037 -0.068 0.037 -0.143 0.036 -0.179 0.037 
const  2.109 0.310 2.254 0.301 0.744 0.297 2.229 0.298 1.219 0.292 
                
obs  17,872  17,871  17,871  17,897  17,895    
log likelihood  -10,680     -11,806     -11,556     -11,852     -12,156    
  
 
 
Table 9: Regressions with future income 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1)
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
future  log(income)  change  0.008 0.041 -0.127 0.040 -0.038 0.039 -0.071 0.039 -0.066 0.039 
east      0.424 0.035 0.371 0.032 0.389 0.032 0.365 0.032 0.322 0.032 
const  2.332 0.495 2.669 0.478 0.969 0.479 2.717 0.474 1.945 0.469 
                
obs  7,405  7,403  7,400  7,413  7,412    
log likelihood  -4,392     -4,817     -4,808     -4,899     -4,993    
  
 Table 10: Regressions with aggregate regional variables  
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when unemployed 
(state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east    0.278 0.050 0.306 0.047 0.354 0.047 0.290 0.046 0.226 0.046 
year02    0.094 0.031 0.213 0.030 0.002 0.031 0.002 0.030 0.117 0.030 
east*year02  -0.139 0.040 -0.167 0.038 -0.072 0.038 -0.146 0.038 -0.174 0.038 
state  income  0.009 0.009 -0.014 0.009 0.007 0.009 -0.009 0.009 -0.002 0.009 
state  unemployment  0.014 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.003 0.007 
transfers (*10
3)  0.040 0.022 -0.012 0.021 0.016 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.053 0.021 
const  1.711 0.437 2.464 0.424 0.630 0.421 2.380 0.424 1.317 0.425 
                
obs  18,488  18,486  18,484  18,515  18,513    
log  likelihood  -11,055    -12,202    -11,959    -12,259    -12,558    
  
                 
Table 11: Regressions with residence  
            
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when unemployed 
(state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east  0.062  0.09  0.183 0.089 0.212 0.089 0.182 0.088 0.122 0.088 
east  living  in  East  0.379 0.092 0.238  0.09  0.205 0.090 0.231 0.089 0.256 0.089 
year02    0.067 0.023 0.169 0.023 -0.009 0.024 -0.027 0.023 0.105 0.023 
east*year02  0.162 0.117 -0.068 0.111 0.100 0.114 0.008 0.107 -0.087 0.113 
(east  living  in  East)*year02  -0.306 0.119 -0.098 0.113 -0.172 0.115 -0.162 0.109 -0.092 0.115 
const  2.146 0.293 2.105 0.283 0.915  0.28  2.133 0.280 1.275 0.276 
                   
obs 18,489    18,487    18,485    18,516    18,514    
log likelihood  -11,061     -12,203     -11,961     -12,261     -12,564    
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 12: Regressions with east states interacted with year02 
 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when unemployed 
(state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when sick (state=1)
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1)
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when requiring care 
(state=1) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
East  Berlin  0.409 0.090 0.496 0.082 0.462 0.082 0.334 0.082 0.435 0.082 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  0.250 0.068 0.269 0.064 0.242 0.064 0.279 0.063 0.382 0.064 
Brandenburg  0.381 0.062 0.313 0.057 0.400 0.056 0.429 0.057 0.363 0.057 
Sachsen-Anhalt  0.486 0.058 0.495 0.052 0.438 0.052 0.496 0.052 0.437 0.052 
Thüringen  0.539 0.060 0.384 0.052 0.389 0.052 0.393 0.052 0.303 0.052 
Sachsen  0.397 0.046 0.449 0.042 0.450 0.042 0.402 0.042 0.338 0.042 
year02  0.071 0.023 0.166 0.023 -0.012 0.024 -0.031 0.023 0.100 0.023 
East  Berlin  *  year02  -0.044 0.127 -0.372 0.107 0.021 0.109 -0.022 0.109 -0.135 0.110 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern  *  year02  0.082 0.099 -0.012 0.092 0.060 0.089 0.002 0.088 -0.181 0.090 
Brandenburg  *  year02  -0.030 0.085 -0.035 0.075 0.022 0.072 -0.140 0.075 -0.233 0.075 
Sachsen-Anhalt  *  year02  -0.133 0.079 -0.229 0.069 -0.111 0.071 -0.216 0.068 -0.221 0.070 
Thüringen  *  year02  -0.456 0.075 -0.140 0.070 -0.098 0.068 -0.123 0.070 -0.010 0.067 
Sachsen  *  year02  -0.063 0.061 -0.202 0.056 -0.108 0.055 -0.186 0.054 -0.208 0.056 
const  2.201 0.296 2.135 0.286 0.897 0.282 2.136 0.282 1.255 0.278 
                   
obs  18,286  18,283  18,283  18,312  18,311     
log  likelihood  -10,929  -12,057  -11,822  -12,112  -12,417    
  
  
 
 
Table 13: Regressions with social conditions as the independent variable 
 
Independent variable: Social conditions define possibilities (agree=1) 
BASIC REGRESSION  REGRESSION INCLUDING 
AGE*EAST INTERACTION 
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east   0.282  0.031  -0.188 0.085 
age*east     0.011 0.002 
age   0.000  0.020  0.002 0.002 
age squared (*10
3) 0.122  0.419    
age cubed (*10
3) -0.001  0.003    
male   -0.153  0.030  -0.155 0.030 
number of children  0.020  0.017  0.022 0.017 
number of adults  0.048  0.015  0.051 0.015 
married   -0.037  0.051  -0.050 0.047 
divorced   0.050  0.073  0.040 0.070 
married but separated  -0.005  0.127  -0.009 0.126 
widowed   0.103  0.083  0.100 0.082 
log(household income)  -0.145  0.036  -0.144 0.036 
civilservant   -0.199  0.074  -0.205 0.074 
self-employed   -0.276  0.069  -0.283 0.069 
white-collar worker  -0.040  0.043  -0.054 0.042 
unemployed   0.153  0.068  0.144 0.068 
retired   -0.129  0.086  -0.117 0.073 
maternity   0.016  0.112  0.005 0.111 
nonworking   0.060  0.059  0.048 0.059 
training   0.062  0.091  0.075 0.086 
other nonworking  -0.165  0.071  -0.167 0.070 
constant 1.330  0.420  1.416 0.300 
          
obs 8,580    8,580     
log likelihood  -5,413     -5,395    
  
Table 14: Regressions with social conditions as a control variable 
 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when unemployed 
(state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
social  conditions  0.076  0.024 0.088 0.023 0.090 0.023 0.087 0.023 0.074 0.023 
east    0.406  0.032 0.397 0.029 0.395 0.029 0.380 0.029 0.327 0.029 
year02    0.053 0.025 0.157 0.024 -0.023 0.025 -0.037 0.025 0.095 0.024 
east*year02  -0.134  0.041 -0.149 0.038 -0.053 0.038 -0.111 0.038 -0.138 0.038 
const  1.807  0.329 1.986 0.320 0.871 0.316 1.958 0.316 1.217 0.312 
                 
obs  16,198   16,203  16,200  16,225  16,223    
log likelihood  -9,666     -10,695     -10,493     -10,739     -11,012    
  
 
 
Table 15: Regressions with luck as the independent variable 
 
Independent variable: Life achievements determined by luck or effort (luck=1) 
BASIC REGRESSION  REGRESSION INCLUDING 
AGE*EAST INTERACTION 
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east    -0.375 0.030 -0.441 0.080 
age*east     0.002  0.002 
age   -0.143  0.019  0.009  0.002 
age squared (*10
3) 2.968  0.380     
age cubed (*10
3) -0.018  0.002     
male    -0.186 0.029 -0.187 0.029 
number of children  0.033  0.016  0.011  0.016 
number of adults  0.079  0.014  0.091  0.014 
married   0.079  0.050  -0.048  0.045 
divorced   0.093  0.070  -0.039  0.066 
married but separated  0.169  0.117  0.049  0.116 
widowed    0.251 0.076 0.135 0.075 
log(household  income)  -0.484 0.035 -0.481 0.035 
civil servant   -0.609  0.083  -0.652  0.083 
self-employed    -0.276 0.068 -0.316 0.068 
white-collar  worker  -0.319 0.042 -0.368 0.041 
unemployed    -0.065 0.062 -0.076 0.062 
retired   -0.156  0.079  0.032  0.067 
maternity    -0.374 0.112 -0.366 0.111 
nonworking    -0.110 0.055 -0.057 0.054 
training    -0.362 0.088 -0.162 0.084 
other  nonworking  -0.427 0.070 -0.335 0.068 
constant  5.615 0.401 3.415 0.289 
           
obs  9,753  9,753    
log likelihood  -5,810     -5,841    
  
Table 16: Regressions with luck as a control variable 
 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of the 
family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. 
luck  0.047 0.024 0.146 0.023 0.079 0.023 0.125 0.023 0.069 0.023 
east    0.419 0.030 0.422 0.028 0.417 0.028 0.414 0.028 0.370 0.028 
year02    0.063 0.024 0.163 0.024 -0.019 0.025 -0.035 0.024 0.103 0.023 
east*year02  -0.136 0.040 -0.145 0.037 -0.049 0.037 -0.122 0.037 -0.158 0.037 
const  1.869 0.317 1.798 0.307 0.718 0.305 1.811 0.304 1.115 0.301 
                
obs  17,533  17,536  17,531  17,560  17,559    
log  likelihood  -10,518    -11,550    -11,340    -11,610    -11,908    
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Figure 1: By how many percentage points is an East German of a certain birth cohort group  
more likely to favor state intervention than a West German of the same birth cohort group?  
Table A1: Summary statistics for the dependent variables 
  
West sample  East Sample  year variable 
Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
age   43.7  18.5  41.3  18.2 
male    47.9%  48.4%    
number of children  0.823  1.040  0.712  0.903 
number of adults  2.411  1.107  2.521  1.121 
married    60.8%  61.9%    
divorced    6.5%  6.6%    
married but separated  1.6%    1.2%    
widowed    7.6%  6.2%    
household income  4,914  2,431  4,069  1,897 
civilservant    4.8%  1.6%    
self-employed    4.8%  3.8%    
white-collar  worker  24.7%  22.4%    
unemployed   3.6%    10.5%    
retired    15.9%  11.9%    
maternity    1.8%  1.6%    
nonworking   12.7%    9.4%    
training    3.1%  4.0%    
1997 
other nonworking  5.2%     4.9%    
age   46.9  17.8  44.5  17.3 
male    47.7%  48.8%    
number of children  0.788  0.988  0.576  0.818 
number of adults  2.193  0.939  2.286  0.898 
married    61.3%  56.7%    
divorced    6.8%  7.5%    
married but separated  1.5%    1.9%    
widowed    7.4%  6.4%    
household income  5,179  2,813  4,258  2,011 
civilservant    4.2%  1.8%    
self-employed    5.4%  3.8%    
white-collar  worker  27.8%  23.6%    
unemployed    2.9%  9.0%    
retired    18.3%  14.9%    
maternity    2.2%  1.8%    
nonworking   10.6%    8.3%    
training    3.0%  4.2%    
2002 
other nonworking  5.0%     5.9%    
 
  
Table A2: Basic regression - ordered probit 
 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
old (state=1, 
private=5) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care 
(state=1, private=5) 
Dependent variable 
Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. Coeff. Std.  Err. 
east    -0.392 0.024 -0.364 0.024 -0.357 0.024 -0.344 0.024 -0.314 0.024 
year02    -0.032 0.019 -0.150 0.019 -0.012 0.019 0.005 0.019 -0.083 0.020 
east*year02  0.114 0.031 0.140 0.030 0.037 0.030 0.133 0.030 0.161 0.031 
                
age    0.026 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.019 0.012 0.021 0.012 0.016 0.012 
age squared  (*10
3)  -0.577 0.238 -0.362 0.245 -0.429 0.238 -0.480 0.232 -0.261 0.241 
age cubed (*10
3)  0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 
male    0.051 0.019 0.099 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.071 0.019 0.015 0.019 
number  of  children  -0.020 0.011 -0.028 0.010 -0.048 0.011 -0.029 0.031 -0.099 0.032 
number  of  adults  -0.016 0.010 -0.051 0.010 -0.030 0.009 -0.027 0.010 -0.009 0.010 
married    -0.056 0.031 -0.079 0.032 -0.030 0.030 -0.041 0.009 -0.007 0.010 
divorced    -0.101 0.045 -0.013 0.046 -0.040 0.043 -0.035 0.045 -0.091 0.045 
married  but  separated  0.054 0.068 0.001 0.069 0.004 0.067 -0.080 0.071 -0.164 0.071 
widowed    0.007 0.049 -0.053 0.049 0.005 0.048 0.035 0.048 -0.048 0.049 
log(household  income)  0.137 0.021 0.251 0.022 0.147 0.021 0.231 0.021 0.148 0.022 
civilservant    0.141 0.049 0.273 0.049 -0.083 0.050 0.156 0.047 0.133 0.046 
self-employed    0.333 0.044 0.427 0.043 0.349 0.043 0.477 0.042 0.337 0.044 
white-collar  worker  0.081 0.027 0.107 0.026 0.035 0.026 0.165 0.026 0.144 0.026 
unemployed    -0.126 0.039 0.003 0.041 -0.119 0.039 0.007 0.040 0.017 0.042 
retired    0.011 0.048 0.095 0.050 -0.118 0.049 0.082 0.049 0.026 0.049 
maternity    -0.040 0.064 0.035 0.064 -0.097 0.058 0.181 0.061 0.103 0.064 
nonworking    -0.010 0.035 0.029 0.036 -0.148 0.035 0.039 0.035 0.005 0.035 
training    0.016 0.051 0.019 0.053 0.071 0.052 0.016 0.051 0.030 0.053 
other  nonworking  0.019 0.042 0.112 0.042 -0.019 0.042 0.098 0.042 0.110 0.042 
                
obs  18,489  18,487  18,485  18,516  18,514    
log  likelihood  -21,179    -20,772    -22,233    -21,729    -20,327    
 
  
Table A3: Basic regression with assets controls 
  
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
unemployed (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
sick (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security of 
the family (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security 
when old (state=1) 
Responsibility for the 
financial security when 
requiring care (state=1)
Dependent variable 
Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err. Coeff.  Std. Err.  Coeff.  Std. Err.
east    0.398  0.031 0.381  0.029  0.389 0.029  0.381 0.029  0.352  0.029 
year02   0.091  0.025  0.184  0.025  -0.006  0.026  0.000  0.025  0.126  0.025 
east*year02  -0.131  0.041 -0.158  0.039  -0.070 0.039  -0.150 0.038  -0.196  0.039 
                  
log(household asset income)  -0.031  0.009  -0.033  0.009  -0.018  0.009  -0.052  0.009  -0.029  0.009 
own  house  -0.077  0.024 -0.059  0.023  -0.154 0.023  -0.114 0.023  -0.111  0.023 
age    -0.039  0.015 -0.035  0.015  -0.030 0.015  -0.051 0.015  -0.026  0.015 
age squared (*10
3)  0.865  0.311 0.729  0.302  0.646 0.303  1.037 0.300  0.407  0.298 
age cubed (*10
3)  -0.005  0.002 -0.004  0.002  -0.004 0.002  -0.006 0.002  -0.002  0.002 
male    -0.105  0.024 -0.086  0.023  -0.016 0.023  -0.033 0.023  0.010  0.023 
number of children  0.035  0.015  0.040  0.013  0.078  0.013  0.051  0.013  0.019  0.013 
number of adults  0.026  0.013  0.049  0.012  0.039  0.012  0.050  0.012  0.013  0.012 
married    0.072  0.040 0.117  0.039  0.036 0.039  0.058 0.039  0.124  0.038 
divorced    0.070  0.059 0.051  0.058  0.032 0.058  0.042 0.058  0.096  0.056 
married but separated  -0.073  0.104  -0.091  0.099  0.013  0.098  0.037  0.099  0.200  0.098 
widowed    -0.042  0.064 0.025  0.062  -0.045 0.063  -0.043 0.061  0.071  0.061 
log(household  income)  -0.138  0.030 -0.259  0.029  -0.098 0.028  -0.184 0.028  -0.106  0.028 
civil servant   -0.130  0.058  -0.244  0.059  0.075  0.06  -0.071  0.06  -0.098  0.056 
self-employed    -0.277  0.055 -0.381  0.055  -0.326 0.057  -0.457 0.057  -0.262  0.054 
white-collar worker  -0.036  0.034  -0.059  0.032  0.004  0.033  -0.106  0.032  -0.101  0.032 
unemployed    0.175  0.057 0.017  0.053  0.145 0.053  0.036 0.053  -0.038  0.052 
retired    -0.084 0.063 -0.132 0.061  0.122 0.062  0.012 0.060  0.000  0.06 
maternity   -0.022  0.087  -0.032  0.085  0.088  0.082  -0.235  0.085  -0.040  0.083 
nonworking    -0.023 0.046 -0.017 0.045  0.152 0.045  0.002 0.045  0.019  0.044 
training    0.012  0.069 0.021  0.066  -0.053 0.068  -0.034 0.066  0.050  0.066 
other nonworking  0.022  0.055  -0.069  0.053  0.074  0.052  -0.010  0.052  -0.065  0.052 
constant  2.159  0.323  2.352  0.314 0.747  0.31  2.196  0.308  1.264 0.305 
                    
obs  16,260   16,257    16,255   16,282   16,278   
log  likelihood  -9,769   -10,692    -10,464   -10,704   -11,020   
  
 
 State year PDS GRÜNE SPD CDU/CSU FDP others
Berlin
1998 13.4 11.3 37.8 23.7 4.9 8.8
2002 11.4 14.6 36.6 25.9 6.6 4.9
WEST
Baden-Württemberg
1998 1.0 9.2 35.6 37.8 8.8 7.6
2002 0.9 11.4 33.5 42.8 7.8 3.6
Bayern
1998 0.7 5.9 34.4 47.7 5.1 6.2
2002 0.7 7.6 26.1 58.6 4.5 2.4
Bremen
1998 2.4 11.3 50.2 25.4 5.9 4.7
2002 2.2 15.0 48.6 24.6 6.7 2.9
Hamburg
1998 2.3 10.8 45.7 30.0 6.5 4.7
2002 2.1 16.2 42.0 28.1 6.8 4.8
Hessen
1998 1.5 8.2 41.6 34.7 7.9 6.2
2002 1.3 10.7 39.7 37.1 8.2 2.9
Niedersachsen
1998 1.0 5.9 49.4 34.1 6.4 3.2
2002 1.0 7.3 47.8 34.5 7.1 2.2
Nordrhein-Westfalen
1998 1.2 6.9 46.9 33.8 7.3 4.0
2002 1.2 8.9 43.0 35.1 9.3 2.5
Rheinland-Pfalz
1998 1.0 6.1 41.3 39.1 7.1 5.4
2002 1.0 7.9 38.2 40.2 9.3 3.3
Saarland
1998 1.0 5.5 52.4 31.8 4.7 4.5
2002 1.4 7.6 46.0 35.0 6.4 3.7
Schleswig-Holstein
1998 1.5 6.5 45.4 35.7 7.6 3.3
2002 1.3 9.4 42.9 36.0 8.0 2.4
EAST
Brandenburg
1998 20.3 3.6 43.5 20.8 2.8 8.9
2002 17.2 4.5 46.4 22.3 5.8 3.8
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
1998 23.6 2.9 35.3 29.3 2.2 6.6
2002 16.3 3.5 41.7 30.3 5.4 2.8
Sachsen
1998 20.0 4.4 29.1 32.7 3.6 10.2
2002 16.2 4.6 33.3 33.6 7.3 5.1
Sachsen-Anhalt
1998 20.7 3.3 38.1 27.2 4.1 6.6
2002 14.4 3.4 43.2 29.0 7.6 2.4
Thüringen
1998 21.2 3.9 34.5 28.9 3.4 8.1
2002 17.0 4.3 39.9 29.4 5.9 3.6
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik 10/2002, p.827, Table 4.
Table A4: Results of elections for the Bundestag, 1998 and 2002